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In a letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, Descartes
explains that non-linguistic behavior cannot be a
criterion of thought or rationality. "I cannot," he says,
"share the opinion of Montaigne and others who
attribute understanding or thought to animals," for none
of our external actions can show "that our body is not
just a self-moving machine but contains a soul with
thoughts, with the exception of words, or other signs."4
For Descartes the difference between man and animal
is one of kind rather than degree. Animals are natural
automata, their behavior explicable in terms of the laws
of physics that govern material bodies. Animal behavior
is not the result of thought, but of "the disposition of
their organs." Since animals do not use words or signs,
they cannot be said to possess reason or a degree of
reason lower than man; that they "have none at all''
follows from the fact that they do not speak. 5
For Descartes animal mechanism is the only
hypothesis consistent with the Christian doctrine of the
primacy of man's soul. It is more probable, he says,
"tbat worms and flies and caterpillars move mechanically than that they all have immortal souls." This
opinion, he states, "is not so much cruel to animals as
indulgent to men-at least to those who are not given
to the superstitions of Pythagoras-since it absolves
them from the suspicion of crime when they eat or kill
animals."6 The possession of a rational, illl1llortaI soul
constitutes a morally relevant difference between

In his history Of Man, Animals, and Morals,
Brumbaugh contends: "It is hard to know just what to
make of Descartes' insistence that respect for human
dignity requires us to show no respect toward animals.
He does not mean hostility, though as far as I can see
he would find nothing ethically wrong with hostility,
except that its motive might be irrational. Whatever we
make of it, Cartesian thought reinforces tendencies that
have militated against morality, sensitivity, and realistic
observation."l On the other hand, Locke is credited with
the humane position "that causing pain or destroying
life needlessly" is morally wrong. He points out that
Locke was convinced that attitudes toward animals
transfer to attitudes toward other human beings.,,2
Cartesians have argued that Locke provides a
philosophical model which denies human freedom,
contributes to elitism, social control, and racist ideology,
while it is characteristic of Descartes' philosophy to
assert the intrinsic dignity of all humans. 3 In this paper
I argue that the similarities between Descartes and
Locke are more pronounced than their differences, that
both regard animals as property to be used to advance
human life and that both may be accused of elitism with
regard to tbe value of life.
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Bracken has written extensively about the difficulty
of stating a racist or sexist position if one is a Cartesian.
Man's "colour, his language, his biology, even his sex"
are accidental, not essential properties. 12 This notwithstanding, Descartes does distinguish spirits or souls in
accordance with a scale of perfection. "It is easy to
believe," he says, "that all the souls that God places in
human bodies are not equally noble and strong."13 A
human body is not different than the body of an animal;
if not "mastered" by the soul an individual would not
be much different than an animal. A noble and strong
soul is one that has a good degree of control or mastery
over the body. With the exception of not determining
value in accordance with species, some contemporary
critics of inherent value theories do not differ
significantly from Descartes' perfectionist view of
man. 14 Frey, for example, argues that mere existence
does not confer value; the exercise of autonomy does.
By exercising autonomy we can pursue a conception
of the good life, a life which includes a variety of cultural
and intellectual achievements. What is missing in the
case of animals is the "same scope or potentiality for
enrichment." According to Frey, lives of less richness
have less value. Given this criterion, some human lives
have more value than others. Individuals are ranked on
the basis of specific virtues and talents, intellectual,
moral, and artistic. ls
Like Frey, Descartes insists on ranking individuals
in accordance with certain perfections. Within a single
species of animal, he says, some "are more perfect than
others, as men are too." All humans are born with free
will and with the capacity to distinguish good from evil.
According to Descartes, the value of a human life is tied
to the same variables that distinguish humans as a species
from animals, viz., free-will, language, and rational
thought. Control over passions arising from the body is
possible only with knowledge and correct reasoning.
There is "no soul so feeble," he contends, that "it cannot,
if well directed, acquire an absolute power over its
passions."16 Vices such as irrationality, excess hatred,
cowardice and jealousy can be remedied by education.
Descartes contends that "low and feebleminded" souls
cannot control passions; "noble and strong" souls do so
and disdain nothing but vice. Those who have a "low
and feeble mind," he says, "are subject to sin by excess;"
passing from superstition to impiety, "there is no vice
nor disorder of the mind of which they are not capable."
According to Descartes, those who have a noble, strong
and generous soul are inclined to render each man "what

humans and animals, a difference which justifies
speciesism. 7
It is certain that in the bodies of animals, as
in ours, there are bones, nerves, muscles,
animal spirits, and other organs so disposed
that they can by themselves, without any
thought, give rise to all the animal motions
we observe. This is very clear in convulsive
movements when the machine of the body
moves despite the soul, and sometimes more
violently and in a more varied manner than
when it is moved by the will. s
In the Principles he asserts that the highest perfection
of man is "to have the power of acting freely or by will,
and that this is what renders him deserving of either
praise or blame.''9
The most intelligent of all animals would not, for
Descartes, be comparable to humans considered to be
marginal cases (mentally or physically impaired). He
points out that "it is a very remarkable fact that there
are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting
idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together,
forming of them a statement by which they make known
their thoughts; while on the other hand, there is no other
animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced
it may be, which can do the same."IO Descartes admits
that within species, some animals are "more perfect"
than others. This can be seen, he says, "in horses and
dogs, some of whom learn what they are taught much
better than others." Although animals can learn
commands and can communicate anger, fear, and
hunger, their behavior is due to "natural impulse" or
instinct and not pure thought. However "stupid and
insane" some people may be, "and though they may
lack tongue and organs of voice," they can nonetheless
use signs which indicate thought and the possession of
a rational soul. H
Since animals are mere corporeal beings and
humans are a union of mind and body, there can be no
real comparison between the two. Animals are not
simply less perfect than humans, they do not share
human perfections at all. The difference here is one of
essential, not accidental properties; species differences
are real, not arbitrary. Because man's essential
properties res\de in his spirit it seems reasonable to
presume that within the human species all lives are
equal or equally valuable.
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cenain animals. It follows that some animals differ from
man in degree rather than kind.
Locke's scepticism with respect to determining the
real nature or essence of the mind prevents him from
drawing an absolute distinction between humans and
animals. In 4.3.6 he contends that it is conceivable that
humans as well as animals may be nothing more than
material beings. We have "the Ideas of Matter and
Thinking," he says, "but possibly shall never be able to
know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no;
it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our
own Ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether
Omnipotency has not given to some systems of Matter
fitly disposed a thinking immaterial Substance: it being,
in respect to our Notions, not much more remote from
our Comprehension to conceive, that God can, if he
pleases, superadd to it another Substance, with a Faculty
of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking
consists, nor to what sort of Substance the Almighty
has been pleased to give that Power,"
Locke argues that it is not a contradiction for God
to grant immortality to life forms that are not immaterial.
Unlike Descartes he does not consider speculation about
the soul, whether human or animal, to be of any
importance to religion or philosophy. For Locke,
animals differ from humans in degree of rationality.
Having general or abstract ideas is, he says, "that which
puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes; and
is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by
no means attain to." Like humans, animals receive
simple or particular ideas and have the capacity to
remember such ideas: "This faculty of laying up, and
retaining the Ideas, that are brought into the Mind,
several other Animals seem to have, to a great degree,
as well as man."22
Like Descartes, Locke holds a perfectionist view of
value in which animals, lacking the intellectual
perfections of man, are considered as having utilitarian
value only. Locke actually goes a step further than
Descartes in claiming categorically that God has given
all animals to humans as property. In the First Treatise
he claims that there is no doubt that God has granted
humans a right to the "use of' creatures "for the desire,
strong desire of Preserving his Life" and thus, he
concludes, "Man's Property in the Creatures, was
founded upon the right he had, to make use of tllOse
things, that were necessary or useful to his Being."23
Man's "Propriety in the creatures," he says "is nothing
but tllatLiberty to use them, which Godhas permitted."24

penains to him" and thus have not only a "very profound
humility in regard to God" but also "render without any
repugnance all the honour and respect which is due to
each man according to the rank and authority which he
has in the world."17 Blom correctly notes that Descartes
is comfortable with speaking of civilized and uncivilized.
"More relevant," he notes, is Descartes' "insistence upon
fostering genuine culture of which philosophy, which is
at once our 'sovereign good' and the highest expression
of human reason, is the greatest manifestation. Thus we
never find Descartes dreaming of an innocent savage.
Rather, good fortune for both individual and society
begins with imitating actions approved by those of
higher wisdom."18
For Descartes, the right to life is species specific
and applicable to all humans and humans only.
However, since not all humans are of equal value,
Descartes accords some humans preferential treatment.
Although animal life has no value other than that of
utility for human beings, Descartes admits that not all
things were created for man. 19
Unlike Descartes, Locke argues that the difference
between man and animal is one of degree rather than
kind. In 2.11.11 of the Essay he contends that if animals
"have any Ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as
some would have them) we cannot deny them to have
some Reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do
some of them in certain Instances reason, as that they
have sence,"20 His disagreement with Descartes is based
on three contentions; first, the real essence of mind and
matter is unknown, second, non-linguistic observable
behavior must be taken as evidence that animals reason
and have emotions, and third, a rejection of dualism.
Locke defines the real essence of objects as their
internal or atomic constitution, an essence which is
unknown. Since we cannot classify species of things
by real (unknown) essences, classification into species
is determined by the observable characteristics that
particular objects share. The definition of a bird, for
example, is not based on a natural or real essence, but
on observable properties that birds have in common.
Locke refers to this definition as the nominal essence
or abstract idea of birds. We cannot reasonably think,
he says, "that the ranking ofthings under general Names
was regulated by those internal real Constitutions, or
anything else but their obvious appearances; Since
Languages, in all Countries, have been established long
before Sciences,"21 Locke often includes the predicates
of tllinking and reasoning in tlle nominal essence of
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Take one, in whom decrepid old Age has
blotted out the Memory of his past Knowledge,
and clearly wiped out the Ideas his Mind was
fonnerly stored with; and has, by destroying
his Sight, Hearing, and Smell quite, and his
Taste to a great degree, stopp'd up almost all
the Passages for new ones to enter; or, if there
be some of the Inlets yet half open, the
Impressions made are scarce perceived, or not
at all retained. How far such an one.. .is in his
Knowledge, and intellectual Faculties, above
the Condition of a Cockle, or an Oyster, I leave
to be considered. And if a Man had passed
Sixty Years in such a State, as 'tis possible he
might, as well as three Days, I Wonder what
difference there would have been, in any
intellectual Perfections, between him and the
lowest degree of Animals. 28

The type of awareness and rationality that Locke
attributes to various animals is comparable to that which
he attributes to the human fetus and young children. In
this case, the ideas received by sensation include hunger,
warmth, light, and pain. Since the mind is furnished
with ideas gradually, there are "few signs of a Soul
accustomed to much thinking in a new born Child, and
much fewer of any Reasoning at all." Qualitatively, the
mental life of a fetus is comparable to that of an oyster
or to vegetables. He who considers this, says Locke,
"will, perbaps find Reason to imagine, That a Foetus
in the Mother's Womb differs not much from the State
of a Vegetable; but passes the greatest part of its time
without Perception or Thought."25
Locke does not consider species central to
detennining the value of life. Whether humans and
animals are something more than organized systems
of matter, the qualitative distinctions between them
are based on degrees of perception, memory, and
corresponding mental activity. Locke does not
hesitate to express the view that some people lead a
life which is qualitatively lower than that of some
animals. His position is not unlike that expressed by
Frey. Frey, for example, contends: "If few people
consider animal life to be without value, equally few,
I think, consider it to bave the same value as nonnal
(adult) human.life. They need not be speciesists as a
result: in my view; nonnal (adult) human life is of a
much higher quality than animal life, not because of
species, but because of richness; and the value of a
life is a function of its qUality." Frey argues that his
position is not speciesist because it does not use
species membership to detennine the value of lives;
it quite explicitly allows, he says, "that some animal
. life may be more valuable than some human life."26
In accordance with this view Locke states: "For were
there a Monkey, or any Creature to be found, that
had the use of Reason to such a degree, as to be able
to understand general Signs, and to deduce
Consequences about general Ideas, he would no
doubt be subject to Law, and, in that Sense, be a Man,
how mucb soever he differed in Shape from others
of that Name.''27
Locke regards the value of some elderly people, as
well as of idiots, to be similar to that of the lowest of
animals. Of oysters, he says, "I cannot but think, there
is some small dull Perception, whereby they are
distinguished from perfect Insensibility," and, he says,
even in mankind itself we have plain instances:
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According to Locke, those considered to be idiots bave
dull perceptions, retain few ideas, do not compound or
abstract ideas, do not judge, think, "make very few or
no Propositions, and reason scarce at all."29
Like Descartes, Locke places ultimate value on
intellectual pursuits and abstract philosophical
reasoning. He argues that shape, sex and color are not
relevant variables in the detennination of value. "Shall
a defect in the Body make a Monster; a defect in the
Mind, (the far more Noble, and, in the common phrase,
the far more Essential Part) not? Shall the want of a
Nose, or a Neck, make a Monster, and put such Issue
out of the rank of Men; the want of Reason and
Understanding, not? This is to bring all back again, to
what was exploded just now: This is to place all in the
Shape, and to take the measure of a Man only by his
out-side."3o Thus, notwithstanding, Locke's view, as
well as Descartes', can be charged with elitism. The
quality of life for both is detennined by the arbitrary
standard of intellectual acumen, more precisely,
European standards of rationality. For Locke, abstract
reasoning and the development of culture and property
are intimately connected. God, says Locke, gave the
world "to the use of the Industrious and Rational."31
According to Locke, God commanded man to labor the
earth, and so entitled him to appropriate whatever land
and other goods he mixed his labor with.
The degree of rationality that is a necessary
condition of the right to acquire and to dispose of
property is specified in the Second Treatise in tenns
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their conclusions with respect to the value of life are
similar. The fact that Descartes is usually considered a
speciesist while Locke is not, does not entail that Locke
regards animals as having any more value than
Descartes. Descartes' position is one of strong
speciesism while Locke's view is best described as weak
speciesism. Both regard animals as tools to further
human interest, both appeal to God to support such a
view, and both stress the necessity of mastery over
animals and nature. The highest degree of value is
assigned to those who possess abstract reasoning and
use it "correctly" to benefit self and mankind.
Schouls argues persuasively that Descartes' views
were absorbed rather than rejected by the Enlightenment, that Descartes, Locke and Newton shared a
common method, a method from which they "expected
liberation and mastery." Views which deny the status
of "Enlightenment thinker" to Descartes, but accord it to
Locke, are regarded as superficial. Schouls points out:

of a capacity to distinguish moral right from wrong.
Locke states: "The Law that was to govern Adam, was
the same that was to govern all his Posterity, the Law
of Reason." The law of reason or natural law "in its
true Notion, is not so much the limitation as the
direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper
interest." To the question, What gives a person "a free
disposing of his Property according to his own Will,
within the compass of that Law?" Locke replies, "State
of Maturity wherein he might be suppos'd capable to
know that Law so that he might keep his Actions within
the Bounds of it."32 The natural law is a God given set
of rules and principles of right and justice. According
to Locke, natural rights are discovered by reason and
include the right to life, liberty, and property. It is clear
that anyone who does not understand and obey God's
command to labor and the law of reason (children,
animals, some elderly people, idiots) does not have
property rights and is of relatively little value to self
or to society. Those who labor more and who
accumulate more property are of more value than those
who do not labor or own property. "Labour," he says
"makes thefar greater part ofthe value of things we
enjoy in this World."
Locke contends that land "left wholly to Nature, that
hath no improvement of Pasttrage, Tilage, or Planting
is called, as indeed it is, Waste; and we shall find the
benefit of it amount to little more than nothing."33
"There cannot," says Locke, "be a clearer demonstration
of any thing than several Nations of the Americans are
of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the Comforts
of Life; whom Nature having furnished as liberally as
any other people, with the materials of Plenty, i.e. a
fruitful Soil, apt to produce abundance, what might
serve for food, rayment, and delight; yet for want of
improving it by labour, have not one hundredth of the
Conveniencies we enjoy.,,34 Locke accords little value
to Native Americans, regarding their life style as a
backward state of nature. "Thus in the beginning," he
says, "all the World was America."35 It is assumed that
the quality of life is better, and hence more valuable, in
a state of society or "civilization." According to Locke,
God gave the land for the benefit of all mankind. Those
who do not cultivate or use it, leave the land to waste, a
violation of the common good. Locke would not find it
plausible to argue that land used by animals and plants
is not waste.
Given the emphasis that both Descartes and Locke
place on reason and science, it is not surprising that
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It is correct to say that the central doctrines of
Locke's Essay determine Locke's thoughts on
education. It is equally correct to say that
Locke shared these doctrines with Descartes,
and that Descartes had published them more
than a decade before Locke became an
undergraduate at Christ Church, Oxford. In
Descartes' works these doctrines playas
crucial a role as they do in Locke's. The
doctrines in question are those about man as a
rational being and about method or the nature
of reasoning, about man as a free being
questing for mastery.36
Neither Descartes nor Locke consider reason or
knowledge an end in itself. In the Discourse Descartes
contends that the principles of science cannot be
"concealed without greatly sinning against the law
which obliges us to procure, as much as in us lies, the
general good of mankind." He urges a "practical
philosophy by means of which ... we can ... render
ourselves the masters and possessors of nature."3?
Like Descartes, Locke stresses the connection
between human freedom and the capacity to reason:
The Freedom then of Man and Liberty of
acting according to his own will, is grounded
on his having Reason, which is able to instruct
him in that Law he is to govern himself by,
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Notes

and make him know how far he is left to the
freedom of his own will. To tum him loose to
an unrestrain' d Liberty, before he has Reason
to guide him, is not the allowing him the
priviledge ofhis Nature, to be free; but to thrust
him out amongst Brutes, and abandon him to
a state as wretched, and as much beneath that
of a Man, as things. 38

I Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Of Man, Animals, and Morals:
A Brief History," in On the Fifth Day: Animal Rights and
Human Ethics, edited by Richard Knowles Morris and
Michael W. Fox (Washington, D.C.: Acropous Books), p. 14.

2 Ibid.,

3 According to Bracken, the empiricist/rationalist "debates
of the seventeenth century and of today are debates between
different value systems or ideologies. Hence the heat which
characterizes these discussions." H.M. Bracken, "Essence,
Accident and Race, "Hermathena, Winter 1973, p. 127.
Similar arguments are found in Noam Chomsky, Reflections
on Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975).

Both Descartes and Locke assign value to humans
by contrast to animals and nature, a traditional
comparison that when adopted by Americans resulted
in the degradation and exploitation of those seen as
closer to nature. With regard to Blacks and Native
Americans, for example, Deloria notes: "Both groups
had been defined as animals with which the white
had to have some relation and around whom some
attitude must be formed. Blacks were ex-draft
animals ... Indians were ex-wild animals who had
provided the constant danger for the civilizing
tendencies of the invading white." The notion that
cultures cannot be judged by the standards of other
cultures is precluded by faith in reason, science, and
progress, by the rejection of superstition. 39 That
which is closer to nature (the less rational) is deemed
a worthy object of control, mastery, and change.
Following Locke's description of the state of nature,
Jefferson regarded the American Indian as an inferior
uncivilized human, yet a being capable of rising to a
state of civil society by the use of reason. This would
be achieved by education, by giving up superstitious
customs, earthly passions, <;ommunal ownership of
land, and by settling down as farmers. Like Descartes,
Locke regards the chief obstacle to the use of reason
as "our passionate nature" or "brute" appetites. He
is somewhat more pessimistic than Descartes about
the ability of all people to overcome such appetites
for the life of reason.
Both Descartes and Locke support a performance
model of man. Both support a hierarchy of perfection
based on analytic reasoning. In spite of Locke's
protestation that all men are born free and equal and
Descartes' claim that reason, by nature, is equal in all
men, this equality is short-lived. 4o Differences in
environment, education, and especially in the
application of reason, result in inequality. Neither
philosophy is able to fully support an ideology which
assigns inherent or intrinsic value and dignity to
animals and humans.
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